Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts

Tuesday, 16 February 2010

Floyd? What's next: Isle of Saint Helena?

Zee Frenchies sont very mad, évidemment... After the years of litigation, Floyd Landis is now 'under mandate of arrest' for the super-duper mysterious 'hacking case' that began in November, 2006, when AFLD Directeur Pierre Bordry had more influence in his small world.


By zee way... Saint Helena was the English-controlled Island to which Napoléon was banished, for the Last six years of his life

Things have not fared well, recently, for Monsieur Bordry; most recently he had (by circumstantial evidence) been roundly (or severely?) chastised for his 'biased accusations' (which appear now to be mostly unfounded) against the UCI, in claiming favouritism over Lance and the Team Astana.


Yet what you want to know now, is what charges Floyd faces, and based on what proof?




Let WADAwatch take you back to the summer of 2009, and our two (no - Three!) articles about this sordid affair. Their pertinence is one-hundred percent pure...


Remember! The 'paid hackers' were a French firm (now bankrupt) whose staff and contacts/agents were former French Secret Service operatives (????), whose other clients were MASSIVE French entities, and whose work efforts infiltrated lawyers or activists whose own efforts were in seeking to expose 'nasty French corporate or Government secrets'... and is not Loyalty one of the 'qualities' of the French culture?


One dark and foggy November night... read:

Friday, 5 June 2009

Le Pierre Ironie: on French Hacking case v Baker


INTERPOL FLASH ALERT
:


Wanted: on international arrest warrants issuing from France, two dangerous hacking financiers;

Crime
: allegedly funded computer hacking/theft of authentic, sub–quality laboratory documents that proved French anti-doping incompet... *some text missing* ... or Alive.


[....]
One might think that Bordry has become addicted to 'news–makers syndrome', à la Dick Pound, former WADA president and the veritable 'Mouth that never stopped'. Hearing Pierre Bordry and the names 'Lance...' or 'Floyd...' is liking hearing GW Bush saying 'Axis of Evil'... empty of meaning, truth very very questionable.


Actually, this recent 'Bordry news Flash' is twice very old news, centering on the claimed computer–hacking by 'someone' of the LNDD laboratory's computer system in 2006; a case which, of itself, took a two and a half–year submarine tour of the French legal 'instruction' system. However, as 'evidence' in Landis' original 'case', it was never mentioned by USADA and Richard Young, for reasons that can only be due to... the negative weight of these allegations?

[.....]
Did AFLD 'control' their data systems to a degree of professional security reasonable for their industry as demands the WADA ISL, and which is recognized as sufficient within its professional community? (if it's facing a hacking case, to prove it was not 'negligent' or 'insufficiently protected', AFLD /LNDD must offer evidence of its (their) control systems in place, and prove that the 'Hacking' from Kargus (who was paid only Euro 2,000) was of "an unexpectedly–sophisticated capability" to win)


Read more from our first article in this three-part series.


+ + + + + + + + +


Only three days later we made further information available, from an intense Internet search of French sites and much reflection:

Monday, 8 June 2009

Holes in the AFLD-zone...


This is a “thinking out loud” post, continuing a focus on the French Anti–doping Galaxy's apparent obsession with Floyd Landis. From a weekend of reflection, several salient points rebounded time and again. These are:


1 how (not to forget one big -IF-) did Baker first contact Kargus?

How easily could a Doctor in San Diego 'infiltrate' the French corporate–espionage culture, to find a well–situated 'partner in crime' such as Kargus consultants? Admittedly such could be done with a 'couple of phone calls', but it seems incredible that Baker would do this after Floyd's A Sample results were announced. What if Floyd (and thus Baker) didn't know the number (995474) before Kargus had infiltrated (with instructions from 'client' to seek documentation under the number?) we know that Judge Cassuto requested the 'date from which Landis had access to his Sample(s) 'control number'?

[.....]


6 Lastly, was Landis/Baker 'the client', or a silent 'third–party beneficiary'?


As touched upon in item #2, the alleged 'Anglo–saxon client' could have been someone that was willing to do anything that might help Floyd, without having a direct tie to Team Landis. As you may be a 'beneficiary' of your parents' life insurance policy, a contract can benefit an unnamed 'third party'. Anyone so inclined as to provide Landis with 'help' from outlaw–shenanigans, and set up the means to do so, ought to be smart enough to receive Kargus' discovered E–files and send them on a CD to Baker, so as to eliminate any network–traces. The only link between Baker and the hacked files is known through his having sent these outward after receiving them.


Read the full (long, dry and detailed) second of three WADAwatch post here


+ + + + + + + + +


Our third essay attempted to provide the English audience with even more detail on the 'French Société' that was at the core of this French hacking case:

Thursday, 11 June 2009

Surveying les French surveillance societés...


It is an interesting company: Kargus Consultants, the company that constructed the hacking transaction into the French laboratoire LNDD. A company offering industrial surveillance, according to Societe.com, Kargus Consultants was founded on November 14, 2003: it has been out of business since October 22, 2007, only two weeks short of its fourth 'birthday'. Paying the price of its success?


Kargus Consultants indubitably provided the sole alleged 'hacker' – Alain Quiros – offering an info–tech commando squad that has made news for three prominent French 'hacking cases': the LNDD–'Landis' affair, the EDF–Greenpeace case, and one involving an activist French attorney (counsel to a French association of small–shareholders), not in that order. The French magazine Médiapart published a detailed article [Ww: controlled access], which was re–posted on the website/forum linuxquimper.org.

[....]
Mediapart does not expand their inflection regarding EDF and Greenpeace, and how the revelations of the LNDD affair brought forth that EDF/Greenpeace process. Intriguing, tantalizing, and yet unfulfilling, as to the interrelationships regarding the three French targets. Using the word 'anonymous' as to the emails described above, seems contradictory to the claims of Baker's involvement, which are discussed throughout the article.



That was the third of three biting probing posts brought to you last summer, by WADAwatch.


Is Plucky Pierre Bordry charting his course of revenge from last fall's UCI/Astana 'J'Accuse!' debacle? Is the French gouvernement a neutral forum, a witting or unwitting player in the latest chapter of:

The Case that Wouldn't DIE?


In the L'Equipe article that appeared yesterday, it is VERY notable to record that the French sporting journal discusses (Translation service: Ww) "Baker and his accomplices".


They do not state that those 'accomplices' were French, were arrested in other affairs, were former French 'secret agents' and were 'very very close' to the French gouvernement.


Why would L'Equipe...

(we remind readers that we boycott linking to L'Equipe... you can find this article (if you read or translate from FR) at L'Express)


... not want it's readers to know the full truth? They should: they're the taxpayers that are paying both AFLD, and the Nanterre Court Judge Cassuto (a bio of him is in the first cited Ww post above...), to either expose or deceive about the involvement of the French former secret agents in this case.



What conclusion to this new-for-2010 state of French affaires?


More French publicity for Bordry, stoking the world Media Machine while all the world is focussing on Vancouver? At least, in this case, everything stated by Bordry is going to be 'On the Record', in court, and appealable to a Fair body without conflicts-of-interest.


Our opinion remains the same: there are more 'elements' in this case pointing to a Watergate-style inside operation, designed to 'add on to' the 'facts' against Landis, 'just in case' their 'Testosterone evidence' was not 'sufficient'.


That's the 'official WADAwatch' theory, at least... and there's certainly more to come


..........@............WADAwatch

copyright 2009 Ww

Thursday, 11 June 2009

Surveying les French surveillance societés...


It is an interesting company: Kargus Consultants, the company that constructed the hacking transaction into the French laboratoire LNDD. A company offering industrial surveillance, according to Societe.com, Kargus Consultants was founded on November 14, 2003: it has been out of business since October 22, 2007, only two weeks short of its fourth 'birthday'. Paying the price of its success?


Kargus Consultants indubitably provided the sole alleged 'hacker' – Alain Quiros – offering an info–tech commando squad that has made news for three prominent French 'hacking cases': the LNDD–'Landis' affair, the EDF–Greenpeace case, and one involving an activist French attorney (counsel to a French association of small–shareholders), not in that order. The French magazine Médiapart published a detailed article [Ww: controlled access], which was re–posted on the website/forum linuxquimper.org.


The Mediapart authors wrote that they saw the dossier compiled by French Judge Cassuto. The dossier asserts that EDF commissioned the infiltration of Greenpeace, that the attorney's computer was hacked on behalf of Vivendi (corporation), and finally, the LNDD 'attack' leads down a trail back to Floyd Landis. By the way: in a Spyworld article, EDF [ED: with Google-translate available, WADAwatch will not often provide long translations] denied (as a corporation) ordering any hacking, however admits that one relevant contract was taken from one of its manager's office (thus implying it to be the act of a 'rogue manager'?) when searched by the 'authorities', and mentions some € 45K for these one or two contracts. EDF also reminds readers that a great amount of EDF 'security' comes from the French military, as protection of its 'nationally strategic' nuclear facilities. Normal for a 'company' that is owned eighty-seven per cent by the French 'State' (87pc).


One man really was the 'go–to' pivot man for the entirety of these 'affairs': Jean–François Dominguez. He brought 'the clients' to Kargus for each of these three affairs.


He was introduced to Quiros by the founder of Kargus (Thierry Lorho), during the early part of summer 2006, to receive instructions (and € 2,000.00) to commence the hack on the attorney's system. Both Dominguez and Lorho have ties to 'French secret service' agencies, although it is not presumed that they knew each other through those associations. It was Dominguez who had the 'slips of paper', which contained, for each case, an email address and list of 'keywords'... and Quiros claimed the actual work (against the Attorney) only took 'a few days'.


That payment seems to confirm the 'going rate' for Quiros' services, and matches the LNDD hacking charges... if true, those facts shoot down one of our WADAwatch theories, proposed in our earlier post, regarding hacking fees. Quiros also appears to be a perfectly successful amateur: this article claims Quiros taught himself 'hacking' (training was as a fireman!), and Mediapart/Linuxquimper quotes Quiros as saying the 'attorney hack' was his first 'illegal penetration' of a computer system.


Dominguez himself eloquently denied having Vivendi as a client: 'I do not know Vivendi, neither from close nor afar'... (what else would he say?) although Lorho confirmed his introduction of Dominguez to Quiros. Monsieur Dominguez is apparently an adventure–junkie: time spent in Iraq and other war zones, as photographer (with proof through published books) or as (.....), and appears, to have substantial ties to the French Secret Service(s). His former employment includes years as a Legionnaire, and various French security companies.


Turning to the LNDD case, Mediapart claims that the hacking events shared identical modus operandi: Lorho stated that, in September 2006, Dominguez passed a paper to him, for Quiros, with an email address and certain keywords, Lorho even stated that he 'folded the paper' and 'wasn't concerned with the contents' of that sheet. Lorho was he who'd told Judge Cassuto that 'Dominguez' clients were 'Anglo–Saxon or American'. Mediapart covered the known 'affaire Landis' in two paragraphs, mentioning his 'guerilla juridique' (taking the Spanish meaning of 'little war'), and then states the most interesting part of this article (Ww translation):


It was in this context that the journal L'Equipe revealed, in November 2006, that the Agence française de lutte contre le dopage (AFLD) had filed a complaint for «intrusion informatique» – and indirectly launched the affair EDF/Greenpeace. In fact, since the end of October 2006, mail and emails designed to appear as if coming out of the LNDD and signalling analysis errors from the laboratory were sent anonymously to WADA, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and to certain laboratories accredited by WADA. However, these false (mails) could not be fabricated without having access to the real LNDD documents.



Mediapart does not expand their inflection regarding EDF and Greenpeace, and how the revelations of the LNDD affair brought forth that EDF/Greenpeace process. Intriguing, tantalizing, and yet unfulfilling, as to the interrelationships regarding the three French targets. Using the word 'anonymous' as to the emails described above, seems contradictory to the claims of Baker's involvement, which are discussed throughout the article.


It does pinpoint that, once the paper L'Equipe revealed this story, it didn't drop the bone: Mediapart claims L'Equipe 'assured that someone close to Floyd Landis was implicated in the diffusion of the false correspondence.' Yet this appears 'known' to all. Dr Arnie Baker never hid the fact that he sent OUT documents 'received from whistleblowers'. Anonymous falsified emails; Baker's whistleblowers' emails; which is it? Both?


One of the strongest arguments in Baker's favour could be this: anyone wanting to discredit some entity, to the point of sending out emails containing information that, as sourced, were acquired through clandestine operations, and if involved in their illegal acquisition, ought to be smart enough to take a CD to an Internet café, create a Gmail account, send out the documents to a list of email addresses, and then close the account, so as to sever any trace of the transactions.


Wouldn't only someone innocent send such emails out from his own computer?


Mediapart stated that:

The declarations of Messrs Lorho and Quiros support the thesis implicating the American cyclist's entourage in the pirating of the anti–doping laboratory. An implication that M. Dominguez refused to confirm. [Regarding a session in Judge Cassuto's court on April 7] he left it understood that, he himself, had done nothing but obey a mysterious order from a client ('commanditaire'), of whom he didn't offer the identity, who had given him 'une enveloppe kraft' that he'd only transmitted to [Quiros] via Lorho, the boss of Kargus.



Nowhere in the Mediapart article, is the crucial question asked: “to whom did Quiros physically give the information he procured through hacking into the LNDD email system?” Also unknown, is why Dominguez refused to state 'who' his 'Anglo – Saxon clients' were, when we know that Vivendi backed the hack into the lawyer's office, and EDF (or its rogue managers) paid for the hack into Greenpeace. One can only wonder if he was paid by 'someone' to 'state' that these were his clients, when in fact they didn't exist?

Continuing, Mediapart said:

“It was only after the fact, that we became aware of the gravity of the facts, and the nature of these actions, properly speaking,” affirmed Dominguez, who concluded: “We had discovered several months after reading L'Equipe that a laboratory had been the object of information piracy. We were perfectly conscious that this was an outlaw act, and that we were put in a position of indirect complicity of the infraction.”



The Mediapart authors didn't seem concerned enough by the evident contradictions to enunciate them: Lorho claimed a paper was handed to him, which he folded, while Dominguez claimed he'd passed an envelope. Dominguez, who'd paid cash for hacking by Quiros previously, apparently woke up 'months after' November 2006, when the L'Equipe articles regarding LNDD hacking began, to the 'reality' that his passing of requests for additional hacking may have legal implications. This from a man whose chequered past allegedly included time as a French secret service agent, a mercenary or war–zone photographer.


Rare, to find someone with an 'ON–OFF' naïveté button as distinguishable, apparently, as is that of Monsieur Dominguez. One thing that tweaks our 'Warning/Alert' knobs is that, apparently, these 'hacking' incidents weren't into the computer–filing–data systems, per se.


Quiros was given email addresses; thus he was hacking into email systems, probably installing a 'Trojan Horse' spyware program, and sifting the resulting data for applicable content, or attachments via the list of selected keywords. This is important: in our previous WADAwatch posts, our focus and thinking was directed toward the 'computer system' at LNDD itself. We presumed (wrongly) that the 'hacking' performances targeted the computer files of original accumulated data. One article, in fact, states that Quiros hacked into LNDD "... to recuperate the Landis dossier." But then, journalists often misplace 'facts': WADAwatch believes Quiros' statement itself.


So: 'documents in transit' were targeted – the contents of in–boxes and out–boxes – not the source locations of the files themselves. This is worthy of noting: the 'information' they 'hacked', was information that had already been sent either internally between one or several of the complainants' LNDD computers, or outward: to the parent Ministry, WADA, UCI or... to LNDD's favourite newspaper? Hmmmm... doesn't this increase the credibility of a theory that a true 'whistleblower' had acted? After all, we aren't informed how many people, in how many institutions, had received emails from LNDD prior to the hacking event(s).


WADAwatch finds it disconcerting that Pierre Bordry and L'Equipe want the world to believe that former French government secret service 'dudes' would take as clients, some 'mysterious Anglo–Saxons', and operate a hacking attack against their own government, who were the main source for their contacts and business. Given the idea of spending time, if 'caught', in a French prison, and given the concept that these men were otherwise protecting major French political and commercial interests against NGOs and activist lawyers, their leap across to Landis' rescue seems outrageously unbelievable.

Evidently, if 'Anglo–Saxons' paid for this, Dominguez should have charged some steeper fees, of which the € 2,000 payment to Quiros would be a mere fraction. We aren't told via the press if Lorho/Kargus received a cut as well, either above or from that € 2,000. If it happened as we are led to believe, perhaps it's no wonder that Kargus Consulting had to shut down operations in the Fall of 2007... their legal defense fees in these three cases may be higher than what they charged(!)...



However the events could have hypothetically come about through a different, perhaps slightly more logical scenario.



If LNDD evidence was as thin as we now know it to be (a T/E test thrown out by AAA arbitration; only one of four testosterone metabolites positive, and only within the margin for error, etc etc), certain French 'factions' that support LNDD in everything it 'achieves', could find it very easy to 'plant' a trail of evidence, via the use of former French secret service personnel, that would create 'damning evidence' (circumstantial) that would 'taint' the bad boy from Pennsylvania: especially after publishing those allegations via L'Equipe, whose unique role in the world of sporting/cycling news obviously remains a source of corporate pride.


Remember, on behalf of Dominguez' commands, Lorho/Kargus arranged for Quiros to hack:

  • an attorney who represented an association of 'small–number' citizen–shareholders, seemingly by command from one (Vivendi was named) multinational French corporation;
  • the French Government, in the 'moral person' of LNDD, by 'command of Anglo-Saxons' (aka 'Landis' entourage'), and;
  • an anti–nuclear NGO (Greenpeace), ostensibly by 'rogue managers' employed full–time by nuclear power–oriented, overwhelmingly State–owned (87pc) EDF.

Fishy? Not bloody likely? Or...?


Bordry wants Baker extradited (our presumption: he actually proposed requesting an 'international arrest warrant') to recount to Judge Cassuto 'his role' in the LNDD hacking affair. Perhaps Bordry should remember the phrase 'Follow the money'? How did Dominguez get paid, if paid from San Diego? Moreover, why did L'Equipe publish that Landis or his entourage was involved in the hacking, before the OCLCTIC (French 'Info–Tech police') knew that Kargus was the corporate source of the computer invasion? Having a 'link' to the receipt of emails from Baker is not evidence itself that Baker financed any hacking efforts. However, there's more than ample evidence of 'obsessive-compulsive' behaviour throughout these revelations.


Maybe 'the clients' were just another fiction, supporting the long line of (... vindictive?) stories from L'Equipe? Only Monsieur Dominguez really knows...


..........@............WADAwatch

copyright 2009 Ww


Tuesday, 9 June 2009

Biological passports: the hour of Verity?


A sometime insomniac, this author caught a story on the Swiss TV network in the 'late night, early morning hours', which brought into light the Swiss anti-doping laboratory, its directeur Martial Saugy, and had interesting news from the UCI headquarters: several riders, whose abnormal profiles are suspiciously 'hors-normes', could be facing 'BAD NEWS' in the near future.

If you are versed in French, enjoy the film clip covering this story (if that link doesn't work, try this one, from the Swiss anti-doping lab itself, and see the entry for June 8th, and the words 'see the video').

You'll see Alexander Moos, talking about the 'burden' imposed by the whereabouts system devised by WADA and within its ADAMS computer system (a definition of which is in the glossary of the WADA CODE, unlike 'Aggravated circumstances').

Martial Saugy explains some of the science, and also has a hope that this long-term biological passport removes some of the 'lawyering' from the aspects of doping detection and discipline.

WADAwatch is in favour of anything that reduces the influence of 'judicial interpretation' of the lacunae found in the WADA regulations, by a 'small group of insiders'; what seems unfathomable by most lay people, is that clear rules reduce ambiguity, and eliminate 'loopholes' or lacunae through which lawyers can extend or expand the necessary legal defense strategies.

(IF you cannot understand French, still this short video with sound OFF may be informatory, as they show the ADAMS computer system screens, with Moos' registered times for the 'Vultures' of whereabouts testing to find him)

More to come this week, on the Landis hacking attack (attack? by Landis, or Baker, or Bordry on those two?)


..........@............WADAwatch

copyright 2009 Ww

Monday, 8 June 2009

Holes in the AFLD-zone...


This is a “thinking out loud” post, continuing a focus on the French Anti–doping Galaxy's apparent obsession with Floyd Landis. From a weekend of reflection, several salient points rebounded time and again. These are:


1 how (not to forget one big -IF-) did Baker first contact Kargus?

How easily could a Doctor in San Diego 'infiltrate' the French corporate–espionage culture, to find a well–situated 'partner in crime' such as Kargus consultants? Admittedly such could be done with a 'couple of phone calls', but it seems incredible that Baker would do this after Floyd's A Sample results were announced. What if Floyd (and thus Baker) didn't know the number (995474) before Kargus had infiltrated (with instructions from 'client' to seek documentation under the number?) we know that Judge Cassuto requested the 'date from which Landis had access to his Sample(s) 'control number'?


2 does Baker know the identity (–ies) of the 'whistle blowers'?

If Baker did receive the documents from 'whistle blowers', did he have enough information to afford this qualifier? Meaning: if he didn't do it, and didn't know or hire who did it, and yet received these documents, it was either totally anonymous (plain envelope?), or 'Deep Throat'–anonymous (in the Watergate sense), or identifiable.


3 on what date (and via what 'channel of evidence') did French Government investigative Police agencies OCLCTIC or DCPJ identify Kargus as the 'hackers'?

As touched upon in 1, above, a 'defendant'
(Kargus) was identified by the 'diligent' OCLCTIC or DCPJ. Is the evidence based on their expert 'computer systems hacking' analyses? It must be. The dates are crucial: yet the 'channel of evidence' is primordial.


4 did (hypothetically) someone other than Kargus actually 'hack into' AFLD, but Kargus was willing to 'play the game' in return for a lesser sentence vis–à–vis EDF/Greenpeace?

These border on unspeakable alternative(s), and are herein proposed hypothetically, but one could conclude that Kargus had attained this 'defendant' status as a 'quid pro quo' situation vis–à–vis its status as
Defendant in the Greenpeace-EDF case, as the contracted 'hacker company', or...(??)


5 why did USADA/Young never raise the 'hacking' issue, which would have qualified Landis' 'crimes' as more aggravated?

Richard Young had, between his first acceptance (not that anyone twisted his arm to do so) of the USADA case against Landis and its resolution, many many months of chronological overlap, during which he was also drafting the new WADA CODE revisions, which were accepted in Madrid in November 2007. As that work included drafting the new CODE Article 10.6 on 'Aggravating Circumstances' (without adding a 'Definition' (see Question Three)), it would seem logical to this legally–trained mind, that proving 'aggravated circumstances' in the Landis case would be a bonus as the CODE negotiations moved forward.


If a 'defendant/cyclist' actually 'hacked' into the lab that held his results, wouldn't that constitute 'egregiously aggravated circumstances'. So why didn't Young use that 'evidence'? There seems an implication that it took a long time for OCLCTIC or DCPJ to actually discoverthe 'hackers' were identified.


As well, remembering how Richard Young's
brief and case against Landis in the CAS appeal had an unusually glaring amateurish mistake (in a 'trial de novo' you do NOT ask the appellate court to 'confirm the decision below': Young did ONLY that in his CAS appellate brief), and interesting incidents which fell outside normal CAS procedures, (see Landis' Federal case brief, in which his attorneys raise damning evidence and arguments that were never heard due to the case having been withdrawn) he could have easily included the hacking evidence as an 'unargued argument', if it had been resolved in France prior to the CAS hearings in New York. So... that seems to indicate it took the 'French Justice system' nearly a year and a half to find Kargus as the 'defendant'(??)


6 Lastly, was Landis/Baker 'the client', or a silent 'third–party beneficiary'?

As touched upon in item #2, the alleged 'Anglo–saxon client' could have been someone that was willing to do anything that might help Floyd, without having a direct tie to Team Landis. As you may be a 'beneficiary' of your parents' life insurance policy, a contract can benefit an unnamed 'third party'. Anyone so inclined as to provide Landis with 'help' from outlaw–shenanigans, and set up the means to do so, ought to be smart enough to receive Kargus' discovered E–files and send them on a CD to Baker, so as to eliminate any network–traces. The only link between Baker and the hacked files is known through his having sent these outward after receiving them.


Thus it would have to be, as Pierre Bordry and AFLD would have the system of French Justice believing, that Dr Baker (or "Anglo-saxon(s) X"):
  • found someone (French!) who would risk infiltrating a French Government office computer system, and risk criminal charges in France, for a ridiculously low price (Euro 2,000);

  • provided them with the 'rider number' (995474) so as to have a target to accomplish the hacking;

  • receive the files (as 'Anglo–saxon clients'? we are led to believe) and then send them forward from their own computer to the recipients.

Those seem to be our outstanding issues, regarding LNDD hacking and any ties to the Landis entourage. Moving onward, since those answers are for another day, we come to the WADA ISL article that was mentioned in our prior WADAwatch post: ISL 5.4.4.4.1.1.

Here it is (from sub–Article 5.4.4.4.1 Data and Computer Security):

5.4.4.4.1.1

Access to computer terminals, computers, or other operating equipment shall be controlled by physical access and by multiple levels of access controlled by passwords or other means of employee recognition and identification. These include, but are not limited to account privileges, user identification codes, disk access, and file access control.




One talks about 'elements' of a law or rule, when one has to break it down into components to be proven in any 'court case'. In our examination of LNDD laboratory security, this would require listing those 'elements' for analysis of the elements of 5.4.4.4.1.1, which are:


First sentence:

“Access...”
(a presumption of legitimate access implied)

“... to computer terminals, computers or other operating equipment...”
(non–exclusive listing of the info–tech and scientific equipment one finds within a WADA accredited laboratory)

“... shall be controlled...”
(mandatory stipulation without exception, the violation of which should be grounds for audit/investigation/discipline)

“... by physical access...”
(imprecise wording: 'control of access... by physical access'(?) this is really problematic drafting, as the sentence should at least contain 'by qualified staff or authorized third parties (eg: systems providers' repair/maintenance personnel) receiving authority to enter into the premises (and systems)...' to define the principle of 'physical access')

“... and by multiple levels of access controlled by passwords or other means of employee recognition and identification.”
(sadly drafted (again); where at least 'physical' was the adjective above, this lacks an 'IT' reference, to coherently define as to 'what' control by passwords, etc., is required to have in place in a WADA lab)


Second sentence:
“These include, but are not limited ...”
(as above, establishing a non–exclusive list)

“...account privileges, ...”
(those computer system or software controls, which allow Directors more access than supervisors, who hold more access than data–entry level staff)

“...user identification codes, ...”
(incontrovertible passwords or other controls, which establish that 'Operator 43' (hypothetical choice) IS he or she whose data–entries create 'the record';)

“... disk access, ...”
(seems to imply 'physical access' to hard–drives, perhaps servers, who in a lab of international renown probably reside in controlled–access 'cool rooms')

“... and file access control. ” (seemingly a redundancy, as 'account privileges' and 'file access control' overlap to a great degree; where applicable to insure perhaps that 'Operator 43' cannot (hypothetically) mistake the file into which 'her' work goes, thus avoiding confusion with files belonging to 'Operator 39'?)


Now even the Pentagon (maybe not the best example: how about... IBM?) suffers from constant attempts at 'hacking' from the outside, not the least of which come from abroad, from 'strategic partners' (Asian powers?) or other (so–called) 'opponents' of 'the American Way'. Point being, that 'hacking' must be acknowledged, to the point of being taken seriously, and government systems themselves should be as well–secured as can be provided by experts in the IT industry.

If AFLD is accusing anyone associated with Floyd Landis, of being complicit in the
alleged LNDD 'hacking', for which Kargus consultants appears to be the 'defendant' of record, then an examination of their (LNDD) data system(s) security structure(s) will enter the record of the case.

Did AFLD 'control' their data systems to a degree of professional security reasonable for their industry as demands the WADA ISL, and which is recognized as sufficient within its professional community?
(if it's facing a hacking case, to prove it was not 'negligent' or 'insufficiently protected', AFLD /LNDD must offer evidence of its (their) control systems in place, and prove that the 'Hacking' from Kargus (who was paid only Euro 2,000) was of "an unexpectedly–sophisticated capability" to win)

If "file access control... disk access... [and] user ID codes" are WADA's preferred means to create 'access trails' to the important, confidential data stored by AFLD/LNDD, the wording of ISL 5.4.4.4.1.1 shows that AFLD/LNDD is not constrained to limit its security measures by these items listed in the ISL: they could have even greater security than the minimum imposed by WADA. (did AFLD exceed WADA's expectations as to data systems security?)


What an interesting dilemma for Pierre Bordry and AFLD. Even with its previous 'wins' against Landis, through USADA/AAA/CAS, its own (we believe illegitimate) AFLD 'second procedure', and indirectly through Landis' US Federal Court case having been withdrawn, there's no rest at AFLD to ensure dotting the *i* in *Landis*.


Now, Bordry must convince a French court judge that Landis' entourage is responsible for financing a 'hack attack' on AFLD/LNDD's most secure and sensitive electronic files, that the successful attack released 'damning evidence', at the same time that it must convince WADA (not that WADA has announced any investigation for suspension of the AFLD 'département des analyses') that its systems are secure, its data is safe, and attacks such as that performed by Kargus (the true defendant, we are informed) in November of 2006, are not a breach of WADA ISL 5.4.4.4.1.1.



We mentioned in our prior post that if Bordry's claim that the documents are authentic is true, then that seems to damn them (AFLD) for this 5.4.4.4.1.1 violation. Whether or not Baker or Landis are involved, if Kargus is found guilty of 'hacking' AFLD, the judge should determine if the claimed method of attack went to the high degree of sophistication that (might) exonerates AFLD from WADA's wrath.



Yet... WADA has never expressed wrath towards anyone in France: not Jacques de Ceaurriz, nor his staff, nor Pierre Bordry, nor his staff, nor the Ministry, nor l'Equipe, nor ASO and its owners.


Consider this: without LNDD, AFLD, l'Equipe, Lance Armstrong and Floyd Landis, the reputation(s) of Dick Pound and WADA would not be what they are today...


And you can take that any way you choose, and bank on it.

..........@............WADAwatch

copyright 2009 Ww



Friday, 5 June 2009

Le Pierre Ironie: on French Hacking case v Baker


INTERPOL FLASH ALERT
:


Wanted: on international arrest warrants issuing from France, two dangerous hacking financiers;


Crime
: allegedly funded computer hacking/theft of authentic, sub–quality laboratory documents that proved French anti-doping incompet... *some text missing* ... or Alive.


Quite ironic, really:


... the Agence française du lutte contre le dopage (AFLD), which under Directeur Pierre Bordry was, merely weeks ago, deprived of an opportunity to inflict a penalty on Lance Armstrong, is back in the news with yet another headline–grabbing 'offense' claimed against Floyd Landis, or his close friends.

One might think that Bordry has become addicted to 'news–makers syndrome', à la Dick Pound, former WADA president and the veritable 'Mouth that never stopped'. Hearing Pierre Bordry and the names 'Lance...' or 'Floyd...' is liking hearing GW Bush saying 'Axis of Evil'... empty of meaning, truth very very questionable.

Actually, this recent 'Bordry news Flash' is twice very old news, centering on the claimed computer–hacking by 'someone' of the LNDD laboratory's computer system in 2006; a case which, of itself, took a two and a half–year submarine tour of the French legal 'instruction' system. However, as 'evidence' in Landis' original 'case', it was never mentioned by USADA and Richard Young, for reasons that can only be due to... the negative weight of these allegations?


From the French newspaper Le Monde, the story–breaking article poses nearly more questions than it resolves. And the date of Floyd's alleged 'convocation', May 5, 2009, means that it took the French media, and/or bureaucrats, nearly four weeks (online article dated 28 May) to get this story into Le Monde.



In its first paragraph, the disdainfully–toned lead–in offers a rebuke for Floyd and trainer Arnie Baker, for 'not appearing' in the Tribunal (Court) of Nanterre, a western suburb of Paris, under a 'convocation' sent to Arnie Baker by French judge Thomas Cassuto (more on him later). The third para. introduces the 'hacking case', filed 'three months' after Landis' July 20, 2006, testing results provoked the Doping Case of the Century. It carries on, stating that 'emails and mail' were evidently sent forth, containing 'LNDD internal documents' “... to sporting and international anti–doping authorities as well as to media with the purpose of discrediting [LNDD].”


The fourth para. then states that a French entity, the Office central de lutte contre la criminalité liée aux technologies de l'information et de la communication (OCLCTIC, literally the 'Central office for the fight against criminality tied to information and communication technologies') traced the IP (Internet Protocol) address (allegedly the 'origin' of 'sent' documents out to various recipients) to Arnie Baker's computer.


Unfortunately, OCLCTIC was not able to discern (or – we are not to know?) from which LNDD computer the original documents were found, hacked into, and then sent out... to how–many intermediates prior to Baker's 'receipt' of these? Impressive how their competence appears stronger for a computer nine time zones away, in San Diego, USA, then an Agency chock–full of computers in which the files originated, and located a mere cheap taxi fare away from OCLCTIC headquarters.


“Irony”??


Anyone remember how AFLD, its hierarchically superior Ministry of Sport, and the then–denominated LNDD ('Laboratoire nationale du dépistage du dopage'; now the département des analyses, directly under AFLD control) used French legal procedure(s) to shield themselves from cooperation with the UCI–authorized investigation that produced the Vrijman Report, during the eight months' period from fall 2005 to spring 2006?


Without going into the reams of information in that report, readers should read sections §§3.6 through 3.9 (Chapter 3: 'Start of the Investigation') of Vrijman (Officially: Report: Independent Investigation – Analysis Samples from the 1999 Tour de France), which contains requests to the French Agencies or Ministries, whose replies WADAwatch is willing to summarize as:


Your independent and duly–authorized investigation's request for more information or documentation...
[ED: in this juncture, requested to resolve 'contradictions' between previous statements offered by LNDD and WADA officials]
...
originating at the LNDD laboratory or AFLD Agency is not recognized as 'independent' under French law, as you are an opposing party....
[ED: there was no 'litigation' between UCI and AFLD/LNDD/Min. of Sport at that time, nor since, to substantiate such phrasing, yet this is the 'theory' that their legal office produced].
Therefore, unless you use appropriate French judicial procedures, ...
[ED: undefined by the cited French correspondence or omitted in Vrijman's report]

... we are very unfortunately not in a position to
fulfill your requests.


SIDEBAR: The investigators (headed by Vrijman) apparently enjoyed refusing AFLD's subsequent request to 'preview' the first draft of the Vrijman report (ostensibly to contest or revise passages concerning the LNDD and AFLD), reminding them that, had they not refused its requests (above), they might have had fewer substantive problems with its published contents.



Irony??


The current Le Monde article states (a Ww translation):


“Convoked the first time via the attaché de sécurité intérieure to come and explain before the French investigators, the American rider and his trainer were re–contacted a second time by email, on 27 April, through Baker's internet web site.” [ED: is that a web–page comments form, Arnie?]


Might this be a US Government “Homeland Security Attaché”? Or some American in Paris, attached to the US Embassy? Maybe it's an equivalent French official, stationed in Washington DC? One expects better writing from the renowned newspaper Le Monde...


Dr Baker is thus fully within his rights, we believe, to have responded to the Judge's 'convocation' as he did. The patronizing tone of the Le Monde writer surges forth again (whom, we presume, does not understand the simple, universal legal concepts of 'citizenship' or 'sovereignty'), as that writer asserts to the French readers that 'Baker bombarded the judicial police with questions'.


SIDEBAR 2: The French 'Civil Code' legal system uses much different pre-trial procedures than those known to the Anglo-Saxon 'common law' system. Not an expert, WADAwatch can add that there are 'judges of instruction', whose actions are designed to fulfill a neutral role, producing a complete packet of evidence, very unlike the US 'adversarial system'. Thus the DCPJ would act as investigatory staff with full police powers assigned to Judge Cassuto's 'instruction' investigation (this also accounts, somewhat, for the long period since this hacking case was first filed). Note that 'neutral' is a euphemism: French justice has been known for 'disappearing' or 'burying' files regarding cases indicting powerful politicians or commercial entities...



The questions Baker strafed (lobbed? drilled?... oh: 'bombarded') across the Atlantic into DCPJ's stronghold would be the same any foreign citizen might ask, when receiving such a bizarre request. We won't go into French legal theories of extra–territorial jurisdiction, but will return to the AAA/USADA hearing failed to use this hacking evidence against Floyd in the USADA/WADA/CAS hearings (below).


This Le Monde article ends with Bordry threatening Baker (and Landis? Unclear...) with an 'international arrest warrant' ('extradition' for a two thousand Euro hack job?). Readers of WADAwatch may remember our fixation with 'Notice' as a legal concept affecting the last AFLD–Armstrong 'dust–up' regarding a Control and a shower.


Evidently the DCPJ, under Judge Cassuto, are as unaware of the legal concept of 'Notice', as was the DCO who'd failed to advise Armstrong properly of the rules and penalties associated with out–of–sight showering. Baker's responses to the Judge indicate that he evidently wasn't made aware (was not 'put on notice' being the legal term of art), from the DCPJ communication(s), as to the 'theory of jurisdiction' (“I live in San Diego, CA?”), 'theory of law and charge(s)' (“what is the object for which you're convoking my presence?”), 'citizenship' (“Why is an American citizen convoked by French police?”), 'consequences', 'vagueness' (“What guarantee have I that I will return rapidly to the United States?”) and 'costs' (“Who's paying the travel costs?”).


WADAwatch would therefore suggest to Dr Arnie Baker that 'reciprocity' applies: Baker has no more need to respond to AFLD and Judge Cassuto, than AFLD had, in refusing to respond to Emile Vrijman and his team in 2005 and 2006, as (cough) 'Signatories in good standing' within WADA.


We know that, in French administrative cases, judicial opinions are not as forthright as those found in the USA: the Landis case opinion from the AAA/USADA Panel had a Decision of some 80–plus pages, and a 26–page Dissent, whereas the AFLD 'illegitimate second case' offered six pages... of anonymous participants, anonymous authors, anonymous experts (which we believe to be contrary to the WADA CODE Article 8 requirements for “... a timely, written, reasoned decision:”).


Regarding Dr. Baker's questions (paraphrased above), Le Monde tells its audience that Judge Cassuto didn't reply to them (evidently, he didn't instruct any subordinates to do so...). French hospitality again? One wouldn't expect such imprecise treatment from an internationally–recognized expert in corruption law.


Judge Cassuto is currently on a judicial 'roll' right now; if you could buy stock in his career, it's a zero–risk “BUY +++”.


Judge Cassuto is currently involved in another hacking case against the same firm – Kargus consultants – regarding the huge, nuclear–power heavyweight French company EDF (Éléctricité de France), who's been accused of financing Kargus' infiltration of French Greenpeace offices and computer systems. Kargus are the actual alleged 'hackers' in both cases, whose hacked information was subsequently sent out to multiple recipients, from an IP address that allegedly defines Baker's computer. There seems no evidence made public to date, that proves Baker is the 'client' of Kargus.


Maybe in France, a judge doesn't have to recuse him– or herself, when running two widely differing cases, each of which involve the same info–tech defendant? However, Judge Cassuto is apparently also an expert in high–level corruption – he was cited as a 'Visiting Expert' for a UN programme regional (Asia: Feb., 2008) seminar entitled:


138th International Senior Seminar on

“Effective Measures for Combating Corruption: A Criminal Justice Response”


In the report regarding this conference, a powerful paragraph reminds some readers of the 'near impossibility' of proving corruption by public officials. It states concepts that most reasoning people accept innately:


First, corruption is normally committed in a secretive manner between a very limited number of parties. Therefore, it is very difficult for the criminal justice authorities to obtain information on corruption allegations and to investigate them.

Second, since those involved in corruption are often powerful, for example, high-ranking officials, politicians or rich businessmen, they frequently try to jeopardize the criminal proceedings by using their influence to tamper with witnesses and evidence, or bribe, or put pressure on, criminal justice personnel.



Judge Cassuto's lecture/presentation isn't summarized, although he is 'named' in the body of this report as one of the 'two experts from Europe'. His own presentation was entitled:


Effective Legal and Practical Measures for Combating Corruption:

The French System


The court, or Tribunal in Nanterre, at which Judge Cassuto sits, is a specialized French 'commercial court'; it was notably involved in a 2001 case involving Microsoft, co–defendants Softimage, and plaintiffs Syn'x Relief (patent holding 3D CGI pioneers: subsequent to that company's bankruptcy, the owners took over the case in their persons), who'd claimed that Softimage (then being bought by MS) had failed in contract to adequately compensate Syn'x Relief in the acquisition of its rights and patents. Syn'x Relief's bankrupted owners sought monetary damages against the two defendants.


Attorneys preparing a case sometimes use a concept called 'making a decision–tree' for legal analysis, and we would wager that this concept is underutilized in France. Basically one tries to develop a series of argumentative 'branches', to assess probabilities, along these lines:


LNDD: was either hacked (see following) or not ('smokescreen' to create suspicions, as cover–up explanation for 'internally pathetic evidentiary standards');


If LNDD was 'hacked' [ED: which we are defining as 'intrusion for document search and 'theft''], it may have been 'done' internally (aggrieved or honest employee 'whistle–blowers'), or externally;


If LNDD was 'hacked externally', the perpetrators were either in cahoots with Floyd Landis, his legal team and/or any associates, OR: A) they were from a certain (unnamed) newspaper with close inside knowledge of all LNDD activities, tied to one Huge (unnamed), Powerful French commercial entity, and intelligent or malignant enough to know and act to protect weak evidence, or; B) they were a 'White Knight' with independent, anti–LNDD (or altruistic?) motivations;


And so on... remember that during the AAA process, Landis' attorneys had pointed to the 'impossibility of proving a negative' at several evidentiary arguments, such as the 'replaced Column' or the 'non–chronological chronologies'.


In this (potentially) Fourth Landis–Tour de France 2006 litigation, the issue is apparently past the first stage of our decision–tree question.


Recapping:

ONE: the 'legitimate' USADA/AAA/CAS 'case' (with 'improper' (IWwHO) WADA–provided funding of the CAS appeal by USADA) producing the two–year ban;

TWO: the 'illegitimate' French AFLD case, adding the 'banned in France' penalty;

THREE: the US Federal Court case (which case was 'withdrawn', settled and/or dropped) alleging gross, illegal conflicts of interest between the 'small group of insiders' who very profitably play musical chairs as advocates today, then Arbitration Panel 'judges' tomorrow, and;

FOUR: this 'hacking case' (which may actually be considered #2 or 3, chronologically).


(Dr. Freud: can you please diagnose the
French-Floyds psychosis???)


AFLD Directeur Bordry knows and must believe in (and prove!) the authenticity of the 'hacked' documents, for this case to have any legs (a statement on VeloVortmax goes to this, but VV didn't cite a link... or 'we at WADAwatch' misread that article?). VeloVortmax reminds us that, ever since Baker first posted these, he claimed the 'documents' were 'sent to me, multiple times, from whistleblowers.”


Clearly, if the documents as sent forth by Baker (allegedly) were forged, then there was no 'hacking' (if forged, there could be grounds for 'interference' or 'defamation' of the Agency). Yet the French 'judicial instruction' by the DCPJ under Cassuto apparently has its hands on the 'defendant' (Kargus consultants), and is looking for the 'big wheel' that financed this 2,000 Euro (+/- $2800) contract.


Interestingly, the choice by Bordry to pursue this hacking case seems tantamount to an admission that LNDD laboratory documentation efforts (WADA certainly included laboratory security in its accreditation process) are substandard, and in need of intense WADA auditing.


Christopher Campbell's Dissent in the 'legitimate' AAA Arbitration procedure, began with this statement regarding the LNDD in France:


... at every stage of testing it failed to comply with the procedures and methods for testing required by the International Standards for Laboratories, Version 4.0, August 2004 (“ISL”) under the World Anti-Doping Code, 2003 (“WADA Code”). It also failed to abide by its legal and ethical obligations under the WADA Code. On the facts of this case, the LNDD should not be entrusted with Mr. Landis’ career.


Here is one small sub–Article of the 2004 WADA ISL (International Standards for Laboratories) regulations, which we believe LNDD violated (or failed to prevent any violation of):


5.4.4.4.1 Data and Computer Security

5.4.4.4.1.1 Access to computer terminals, computers, or other operating equipment shall be controlled by physical access and by multiple levels of access controlled by passwords or other means of employee recognition and identification. These include, but are not limited to account privileges, user identification codes, disk access, and file access control.


From the 1805 pp. PDF transcript of the 'legitimate' Landis arbitration hearing, it appears that 'computer security' as to hacking was never raised by either the USADA team under Richard Young, nor the Landis attorneys. A following sub–Article does appear when questioning two witnesses about the trail of 'corrections' or 'data protection' found in 5.4.4.4.1.4. Those two witnesses were LNDD lab staff member Cynthia Mongongu (transcript pp. 393–394) and Dr. Christine Alyote (transcript p. 647), who heads the Montreal anti–doping laboratory. No witness testified as to computer security breaches that may fall under 5.4.4.4.1.1, which evidence one presumes would have carried more weight than Young's using Greg Lemond in futile attempts at character assassination.


Fellow blog–master Rant, of Rant Your Head Off, directly contacted Dr Arnie Baker in April regarding his potential involvement. Rant transcribed Baker's response:

Thank you for bringing this to my attention.
I did not hack into, nor did I help or hire anyone to hack into the LNDD computer system.


WADAwatch has also corresponded on several occasions, some time ago, with Arnie Baker. We believe him to be an honest, intensely–focused man. However, WADAwatch would have appreciated his statement even more, had Baker added:


“... nor do I have any knowledge of any involvement by anyone associated in any way with Floyd Landis in this French 'lab hacking' affaire...”
(to make 'ironclad' what Rant calls 'unequivocal'; which is true, to the limits of Baker's alleged 'involvement').


However, where AFLD is involved, logic seems lost in France: Kargus consultants allegedly is owned by a former French 'Secret services' agent (thanks to Rant quoting Mark Ziegler of the San Diego Union–Tribune). Think about that: a 'Blackwater wannabe'...


Baker's ties to France are extremely limited. Whether Baker speaks French or not... On ne le sait pas du tout... (“we don't know that at all”)


Did you see the map above? The only player missing is Kargus, who are perhaps headquartered in Nantes, near the north end of the western coast.


Kargus' business evidently associates itself with the richest and most powerful in France, if it is doing similar hacking work for EDF against Greenpeace's computer system(s). Judge Cassuto seems to be known as one who fights against corruption by such people, and those in government who enrich themselves, and their career paths, in service of producing, performing or fulfilling the corrupt acts against which Cassuto fights. 'Anglo–saxon', used to describe the 'clients' of Kargus' LNDD hacking contract, seems a strange choice of words if one is describing one or more 'American(s)'. The normal usage of 'Anglo–saxon' by the French is primarily linguistic (this author is often asked where in England I am from: Minnesota is not Manchester!).


If Kargus is on a judicial hot–seat from the EDF/AFLD cases of hacking, it would be in their presumed interests to be slightly more precise as to their clients' origins... Non?


Citing Kargus in the Landis 'case', seems awfully paradoxical, given that its role in the EDF–Greenpeace case rises to that level of 'nasty behaviour' that leads to dissolutions of companies. One presumes that the 'bill' for Kargus' services against Greenpeace was modestly higher than the 2,000 Euros ascribed to the Landis hacking affair...


In premature conclusion, regarding a still–inconclusive case brought yet again by anti–American cylist–obsessed AFLD Directeur Bordry, we can only wonder if such desperate action is the only thing that is keeping him from losing his cushy job, offering office views of le Tour Eiffel or Notre Dame?


This author believes (and can no more prove than did Landis) that gross incompetence and constant violations of the WADA Code (the only legal vehicle anointing their laboratory, at the least, with any form of legitimacy), within the former LNDD (département des analyses) and AFLD, had serious repercussions, which in turn led to the 'atomic conjunction': 'back room' agreements between Madame la Ministre Rosalyn Bachelot, UCI President Pat McQuaid, and ASO owner Madame Amaury, as evidenced by Hein Verbruggen's resignation from UCI, Patrice Clerc's ouster from ASO, the questionable verdict(s) in the 'legitimate' Landis AAA/CAS arbitrations (as denoted by Landis' Complaint in US Federal Court), and, the pronouncement by Madame Amaury herself that her Equipe newspaper staff would no longer subvert the Athletes' rights to confidentiality in the period between A Sample analysis results and the requested B Sample process.


Such circumstantial evidence seems to lead to the 'conclusion' that one high–level French bureaucrat – AFLD's Bordry – has been reduced to a nervous, panicking, obsessional vestige of his former self. This premise originates from the circumstantial evidence found in the public record, and our consistent, previous reflections.


We also could 'go Sherlock', wondering how Bordry's career (or De Ceaurriz'?) was aided by Jean–Pierre Lamour, the former WADA VP, and runaway candidate for the WADA presidential post now held by John Fahey of Australia? Which could have him standing 'without necessary patronage' now... and simultaneously protecting his buffoon De Ceaurriz, the laboratory's Directeur.


Or maybe Plucky Pierre Bordry simply detested our last cartoon? (smile... c'était pour rire...)


Ask yourself why anyone French(!) would 'hack into' a French agency for only 2000 Euros, when you knew (or could reasonably presume): A) Landis had a huge (two–million dollar) legal budget; B) any documents found therefrom could be the “value–added” linchpin to his defense, and; C) you might have to appear in front of Judge Cassuto one day, as a defendant? If the facts as alleged are true, Kargus consultants are badly in need of a risk–analysis officer.


Maybe Baker and Landis should go to Paris, and visit the 'très aimable' Judge Cassuto (“very likeable”). We could, perhaps at last, get to the bottom of the Parisian anti–doping Triangle (AFLD, LNDD, Equipe)... and undermine the corruption that appears to allow these French/WADA Signatory Agencies to operate in a totally free–from–sanctions, “Peter Principle”–fulfilling environment?


Last thought: the French Legal system has more pressing legal crises to finance in this year of economic turmoil, than to allow itself to be 'hijacked' by Pierre Bordry and his obsessional intransigences... recently in Paris, three criminal cases were 'dismissed' due to the deplorable, Third World–ish sanitary conditions of the Palais de Justice holding cells... the funds spent by Bordry to harass Floyd Landis and Arnie Baker could be better spent replacing outdated machines and software, creating non–existent SOPs and improving computer systems protection within AFLD's département des analyses.


Ensuring that this happens is why WADA exists.


..........@............WADAwatch

copyright 2009 Ww


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